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Abstract: This article reviews the geographical dynamics of New Hollywood, arguing 
that the industrial crisis of 1969-1971 catalyzed further decentralization of location 
shooting beyond Los Angeles, bringing new types of urban space into view. It examines 
the parallel crisis and restructuring of the film industry and the inner city via  two films, 
The King of Marvin Gardens (1972) and Rocky (1976), which are emblematic of distinct 
phases in the development of New Hollywood. Through their aesthetic strategies, 
narrative structure and mapping of cinematic space, these films produce allegories of 
urban decline and renewal that closely engaged with the transformation of the American 
city, from the urban crisis of the late 1960s to neoliberal programmes of renewal in the 
late 1970s. 
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At the end of the 1960s, the Hollywood studios and the American inner city faced 
historic crises that seemed to threaten their very existence. While the studios recorded 
substantial losses, estimated at a combined figure of $600 million between 1969 and 
1971, the formerly prosperous centers of American cities were mired in an urban social 
crisis that was fast transforming into a widespread economic crisis.1 Although both 
situations were products of complex and distinctive historical factors, there are 
nevertheless important ways in which the two crises not only occurred in parallel but 
were necessarily intertwined. This article explores the simultaneous crisis and 
restructuring of the motion picture industry and the American inner city, arguing that 
taking an explicitly spatial perspective opens up new avenues for conceptualizing an 
apparently well-understood period of Hollywood history.2  
The crisis and reorganization of the Hollywood film industry at the end of the 1960s had 
important and as yet under-examined geographical dynamics. While the industrial crisis 
accelerated the long-term shift towards package deals and independent production, it 
also had a significant impact on the volume and geographical pattern of location 
shooting. This opened up new cinematic terrain for Hollywood, expanding location 
shooting beyond its established co-ordinates — for example, Manhattan or parts of the 
American West — into new locales, from small towns and rural landscapes to the 
(post)industrial cities of the so-called ‘rust belt’. In this piece, I focus in detail on two 
films that are emblematic of two phases of New Hollywood and which illuminate 
different aspects of this historic transition. The first, Bob Rafelson’s melancholy, 
autumnal The King of Marvin Gardens (1972), made in Atlantic City and produced on a low 
budget for BBS, epitomizes the small-scale, personal cinema that emerged from the 
industrial crisis of 1969-1971. In contrast, Rocky (John G Avildsen, 1976), shot on 
location in Philadelphia, stands at a key transition point in the late 1970s, when a second 
wave of New Hollywood, best exemplified by the more commercially-oriented and 
accessible work of the so-called ‘movie brats’, was radically departing from (and for many 
critics, vanquishing) the artistic and political possibilities of the first wave.3 Through close 
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analysis of the films’ locations and construction of cinematic space, I propose to reframe 
our understanding of their political meanings within the specific context of urban crisis 
and neoliberal paradigms of redevelopment that emerged in the 1970s. 
My aim here is to combine an industrial and economic perspective with fine grained 
analysis of the spatial and textual dynamics of seventies cinema. In doing so, I draw on 
Fredric Jameson’s notion of ‘cognitive mapping’ and its lineage in the work of the 
American urbanist Kevin Lynch, whose classic book The Image of the City (1960) 
compared the mental cityscapes recalled by citizens of Boston, Jersey City and Los 
Angeles. Analyzing drawings made by local residents, Lynch contrasted the 
“imageability” of dense, historically layered cityscapes such as Boston with the 
formlessness and fluidity of the built environment in cities such as Jersey City and 
especially Los Angeles, where few iconic landmarks were available to orient the user in 
their surroundings.4 For Jameson, this relationship of the individual subject to a wider 
social structure provided a compelling spatial figure for the problematic of contemporary 
capitalism, in which a new set of global relationships essentially displaced older forms of 
political thought and representation.5 This was developed in one of Jameson’s earlier 
pieces on film, an essay on Dog Day Afternoon (Sidney Lumet, 1975) which appeared 
seven years before his seminal piece on postmodernism.6 The geographical focus of this 
piece was later underscored by Jameson’s call for a ‘spatial analysis of culture’, in which a 
close attention to space was vital in moving beyond the impasses of Marxist aesthetics 
and the seemingly irresolvable split between realism and modernism (terms, of course, 
beginning to lose purchase in the media-saturated world of the late 20th century). Films 
produce cognitive maps both through their formal articulation and engagement with 
space, and the relationship developed between the protagonist(s) and their diegetic 
world. Importantly, ‘cognitive’ here is not understood to exclude embodied 
spectatorship, but also encompasses a range of affective responses to cinematic space. In 
this piece, I adapt elements of both Lynch and Jameson’s notions of ‘cognitive mapping’ 
to establish ways in which a film’s spatial form produces relations of visibility, mobility 
and affectivity within the urban environment, and examine how these produce political 
meanings in a specific geographical and historical context.  
New Hollywood: A Geographical Perspective  
Hollywood and the American city were both deeply affected in the mid-twentieth 
century by large-scale demographic, geographical and cultural shifts. Foremost among 
these was the historic migration of young, prosperous couples and families from the city 
to the rapidly expanding suburbs. Suburbanization therefore played a central role in the 
fate of the inner city and the crisis of Hollywood’s mass audience: as urban centers 
declined, so did their entertainment districts and the first-run theatres that had generated 
the lion’s share of studio profits in the era of vertical integration. Yet even more than this 
was at stake: no less than a wholesale reorganization of patterns of urban life, of 
consumption and leisure, and the use and meaning of public and private space. By the 
late 1960s, the most visible manifestation of the burgeoning crisis in the inner city was 
the series of urban uprisings or ghetto riots that ripped across African-American 
neighborhoods from coast to coast, most famously in Watts, Los Angeles (1965), Detroit 
(1967), and Newark (1967). Yet the riots were not a cause but rather a symptom of a 
wider malaise.7 The ‘urban crisis’ of the mid-to-late 1960s, closely associated with the 
ghetto riots and largely understood in the United States as grounded in issues of poverty, 
racial discrimination and civil rights, developed into a broader, more fundamental second 
phase in the 1970s. As an editorial for the Wall Street Journal outlined in 1975, this ‘New 
Urban Crisis’ compounded the familiar symptoms of urban blight and social unrest with 
mushrooming deficits, decaying infrastructure, faltering public services and fiscal crises 
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that pushed municipal governments to the brink of bankruptcy.8 New York City was an 
exemplary case, narrowly avoiding default in 1975 despite the Ford administration’s 
famous refusal to extend federal aid and later ‘rescued’ and restructured by an emergency 
coalition of investment banks and other corporate interests. Likewise, major cities across 
the rust belt, such as Philadelphia, Detroit and Cleveland, were pushed near to insolvency 
by the double whammy of eroding tax bases and spiraling welfare commitments.  
From the mid-1970s, a new paradigm began to emerge from the ashes of the urban 
crisis. The perceived failure of both Keynesian economics and liberal social policy paved 
the way for a set of neoliberal political strategies at urban and national scales. Building on 
the economic theories of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School, and reinforced by an 
ideological commitment to the free market and entrepreneurialism, neoliberal policies 
advocated fiscal deregulation and retrenchment in social spending, and placed a new 
emphasis on finance capitalism as the motor of economic growth. Cities were therefore 
not merely passive subjects of neoliberalism; rather, they were often at the cutting edge, 
operating as testing grounds for national economic policy. Deregulation, public-private 
partnerships and property speculation became established, if contested, protocols for 
downtown and neighbourhood redevelopment.9 By the late 1970s, Time magazine 
heralded a ‘downtown renaissance’. Conveniently bracketing the deep social problems of 
American cities, the editorial championed a new skyscraper boom that was transforming 
central business districts from Cleveland and St Louis to Atlanta and Los Angeles.10   
Of course, the same time span, from roughly 1967 to 1977, also witnessed the first 
iteration of a ‘New Hollywood’, during which the so-called ‘Hollywood Renaissance’ or 
‘New American Cinema’ exploded onto movie screens. Accounts of this celebrated 
period of American cinema emphasize, in varying degrees, different aspects of the 
narrative, whether industrial/institutional (package production, corporate takeovers, the 
demise of the production code), aesthetic (the influence of European cinema, television 
and exploitation film), auteurist (a new ‘film school generation’), or cultural/historical 
(the New Left and the counterculture).11 Nevertheless, most commentators agree that the 
preconditions for a ‘new’ Hollywood were generated by industrial instability, opening up 
a relatively brief period of innovation and experimentation that would be foreclosed by 
the emergence and triumph of the blockbuster logic in the second half of the decade.  
The origins of the crisis can be traced back to the late 1940s, when post-Paramount 
Decree Hollywood sought resolutions to its various problems, whether through 
production differentiation, technological innovation, or accommodation with (and 
expansion into) the new medium of television. At the same time, geographical expansion 
provided a vital lifeline in the struggle to maintain profitability and market dominance. 
While distribution and marketing further saturated Hollywood’s international market 
coverage, increasing amounts of runaway production capitalized on cheap European 
studios, locations and labor. But runaways became less attractive in the face of an 
emerging global recession, industrial unrest in Europe, and Nixon’s devaluation of the 
dollar in 1971. In contrast, the industry’s “spatial fix” of the 1970s would involve the 
reorganization of production within the United States, with the increased mobility and 
territorial flexibility offered by location shooting becoming central to the new business 
structure.12   
The break-up of the studio system and its passage towards a flexible and characteristically 
post-Fordist model had been developing throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but 
accelerated during the intensive period of change between 1969 and 1971.13 At the end of 
the sixties, the structural flaws in the industry’s business model were brought to the 
surface by a series of expensive flops, largely studio-based musicals such as Doctor 
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Doolittle (Richard Fleischer, 1967) and Hello, Dolly! (Gene Kelly, 1969). The studios fell 
deep into the red: in 1969, the Hollywood majors recorded combined losses of $200 
million, while over the following two years, the industry suffered total losses of some 
$600 million.14 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the studios (and their new 
corporate owners) responded with efforts to restructure and reorganize the business.15 At 
Fox, often viewed as the bellwether of the film industry, August 1970 saw the studio in 
what Variety described as “throes of economic uncertainty”, with Darryl Zanuck and his 
son Richard initiating “a restructuring program of perhaps unprecedented proportions” 
in order to “redesign the make-up of 20th to bring it in tune with today’s film business 
and national economy”. Streamlining of payroll and the production slate was combined 
with further exploitation of real estate assets, especially continuing development at 
Century City (which had been underway since the early 1960s).16 The studios made 
broadly similar cost-cutting moves, cutting headcount, shaking up creative and 
management structures, placing limits on production budgets, and making further 
divestitures of land and other fixed assets.17 MGM was perhaps the most extreme case. A 
year after posting losses of $35 million in 1969, new owner Kirk Kerkorian sold the 
entirety of MGM’s soundstages in Culver City to real estate developers for $7.3 million, 
saved a further $8.3 million by shifting their head office from New York to Culver City, 
and closed 22 of their 32 sales offices.18 By early 1971, their withdrawal from Los 
Angeles was complete, with the small slate of forthcoming MGM features shooting 
either in New York City or overseas.19  
Stanley R. Jaffe, Chief Operating Officer at Paramount, described their restructuring 
strategy to Life magazine in 1970:  
We intend to cut down this company until we have an organization that can 
support 12 to 15 pictures a year. In a small building in Beverly Hills our whole 
feature production staff will be just 25 people including secretaries. As for the 
studio, we’re going to get rid of it. That delights me personally. Without that 
tremendous overhead we will finally have flexibility. It’s like the army. A general 
can move ten men more easily than a thousand. In the future we can be more 
receptive to changes in the marketplace without the studio hanging around our 
necks.20 
While Paramount did not quite go as far as Jaffe suggests, his comments give a sense of 
the prevailing corporate attitude in Hollywood at the time. The picture painted here 
indicates a new ideal conception of the ‘studio’ as a streamlined operation, outsourcing 
everything but core financial and managerial functions in order to remain flexible and 
receptive to changes in the audience. From this point onwards, the Hollywood majors 
became primarily financiers and distributors, with the greater share of production 
subcontracted to independent companies, who could operate more efficiently, flexibly 
and innovatively than the studios. Without in-house production space, nor the 
economies of scale involved in serial production, independent production companies 
increasingly used non-studio locations for the majority of exterior and interior scenes. 
This was made possible by technological innovation in more sensitive film stocks, 
lightweight cameras such as the Arriflex 35BL and the Panaflex, faster lenses, and other 
mobile filming equipment such as the Cinemobile, a portable, self-contained film studio 
in a van.21 
Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, location shooting shifted from being an 
important component part of what was essentially still a studio-based production process 
to become the dominant production technique Hollywood filmmaking.22 If the 
Hollywood sound stages were often empty at the end of the 1960s, it was in part due to a 
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new generation of filmmakers for whom the authenticity and directness of location 
shooting was fundamental to their artistic vision. However, it might have remained a 
minority technique without the economic pressures of the 1969-1971 crisis; following the 
restructuring of the studios, location shooting became a necessity rather than a choice. 
As Don Haggerty, President of the AFL-CIO Film Council, made clear, the benefits of 
location shooting meshed with the cost-cutting imperatives of the studios’ corporate 
management, with incentives including “avoidance of studio overhead, avoidance of state 
corporate taxes on production, free or cheap city and state licensing, the ability to dodge 
payment on fringe benefits, cheaper extras, and loose or non-existent union regulations 
that allow production savings.”23 The increased mobility of production also allowed the 
studios to evade direct confrontation with labour. If disputes flared up, shooting could 
now be relocated with little difficulty, as Paramount had done with the Woody Allen 
project Play it Again, Sam (Herbert Ross, 1972), one of three films pulled from 
production in Manhattan as a result of what Paramount President Frank Yablans deemed 
“intransigence” on the part of local unions.24 
During the 1970s, the turn to flexible specialisation developed in what Michael Storper 
and Susan Christopherson describe as a “split-locational pattern”.25 While corporate 
headquarters and the majority of the new independent pre- and post-production facilities 
remained in Southern California, shooting itself became widely dispersed across the 
United States. Though this is necessarily difficult to quantify, contemporary estimates 
suggested that around 70% of production was being filmed on location outside Los 
Angeles by 1974.26 If this was due in part to Hollywood’s search for cheap and novel 
locations, there were also forces pulling from the other direction. In the face of industrial 
decline and eroding tax bases, cash-starved municipal governments were beginning to 
turn away from publicly funded construction projects in favor of public-private 
partnerships and new policies of culture-led regeneration that would become widespread 
in the decades to come. As a result, from the late 1960s, cities and states began to 
compete at a new level of intensity for the expanding location shooting dollar, luring 
production companies with tax breaks, minimal regulation, and non-unionized 
workforces. Such incentives were increasingly coordinated by city and state film 
commissions, leading to what the Hollywood Reporter called a “scramble for the now 
fragmented lodes of movie gold” and the New York Times referred to as “an ever 
spreading though undeclared war for location shooting.”27 New York City was a 
trendsetter in this respect. The Mayor’s Office of Motion Pictures and Television, 
established 1966 by Mayor John V Lindsay, effectively provided a blueprint for city and 
state film commissions across the world in coordinating permits, streamlining procedures 
and promoting the city as a destination for Hollywood productions.28 By 1976, when the 
first convention of film commissions or “Cineposium” was held in Denver, thirty city 
and state governments had departments or associated organizations dedicated to 
promoting location shooting.29  
This decentralization of production was widely reported in the trade press and in local 
newspapers, often mixed with a shot of civic boosterism. For example, in 1976, Chicago 
Times film critic Gene Siskel summed up the benefits of location filming for the Windy 
City: “To put it simply, this moviemaking boomlet is one very nice development. Nice, 
because our town and state are benefitting financially. Nice, because our town’s talented 
film crews are getting work. And nice, because a variety of public and private citizens are 
working together to freshen our city and state images by exposing them to display on 
wide and small screens throughout the world.”30 As Siskel’s comments suggest, while in 
the first instance, the promotion of urban location shooting was motivated by economic 
imperatives, the cultural representation of the city was also becoming an increasingly 
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important commodity itself during the 1970s. In this way, the rise in location filming 
during the period was also congruent with the strategic aspiration of city governments to 
manage and project an image of their city for a global marketplace. As cities adapted to a 
predominantly service-sector economy, they began to position themselves as global 
financial centres and tourist destinations, hubs of leisure and consumerism. This reflects 
David Harvey’s assertion that modes of urban governance had begun to shift during the 
1970s from what he terms a “managerial” to an “entrepreneurial” paradigm, whereby 
cities and regions have been increasingly compelled to compete on the open market for 
mobile flows of capital and labour.31 The cinematic representation of the city thus 
developed alongside and in tandem with new schemes for city branding during this 
period.32 Film commissions were therefore one of a number of quasi-public bodies at 
municipal level, such as redevelopment agencies and convention and visitors bureaus, 
that sought to promote the city and its revitalized downtown as a safe place for tourists 
and as an attractive location for company headquarters. In this way, two simultaneous 
processes — the terminal crisis of the studio system and the rise of cultural strategies for 
redeveloping and rebranding the post-industrial city — provided the institutional and 
economic framework for the decentralization and dispersal of Hollywood location 
shooting. 
The postindustrial city therefore emerged not only as an artistic inspiration for New 
Hollywood, but also as a production resource and visual commodity. As a result, 
American cinema of the 1970s displayed a new authenticity or verisimilitude in its images 
of the urban landscape; not since the heyday of film noir in the late 1940s had 
Hollywood film engaged so closely with the American city.33 The most prominent 
production centres were undoubtedly New York and San Francisco, both of which 
experienced a film industry boom in the early to mid-1970s.34 Both cities could capitalize 
on distinctive, instantly recognizable and often beautiful cityscapes, were long-standing 
cultural hubs, and had pro-active local government support for filmmaking. But equally 
importantly, Hollywood location shooting moved beyond these established cinematic 
cities.  In the late 1960s and 1970s, films were shot in cities — and importantly, specific 
areas of cities — that had been rarely, if ever, seen in mainstream feature films before. 
Previously peripheral or marginal spaces came into view. Cinematic New York now 
extended beyond its traditional Manhattan base into as-yet-unexplored parts of the 
Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens. Hollywood made new forays into Brooklyn, taking in 
gentrifying areas such as Park Slope in The Landlord (Hal Ashby, 1970) and Brooklyn 
Heights in Desperate Characters (Frank Gilroy, 1971), as well as working class districts such 
as Bay Ridge in Saturday Night Fever (John Badham, 1977). African-American filmmaking 
and the so-called ‘blaxploitation’ genre capitalized on authentic locations in Harlem, in 
films such as Cotton Comes to Harlem (Ossie Davis, 1970) and Super Fly (Gordon Parks Jr., 
1972). Further afield than New York, the streets, buildings and neighborhoods of 
declining industrial cities began to assume a new prominence on screen: for example, 
Philadelphia in Rocky (John G. Avildsen, 1976), Chicago in Medium Cool (Haskell Wexler, 
1968), blue-collar Boston in The Friends of Eddie Coyle (Peter Yates, 1973) and The Last 
Detail (Hal Ashby, 1973), Detroit in Scarecrow (Jerry Schatzberg, 1973) and Blue Collar 
(Paul Schrader, 1978), and the steel town of Clairton, PA in The Deer Hunter (Michael 
Cimino, 1978). In the remainder of this piece, I analyze two of these films in detail and 
consider the ways in which their cinematic mapping of urban space engaged with 
contemporary political concerns, generating what I define as allegories of urban decline 
and renaissance.  
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The King of Marvin Gardens (Bob Rafelson, 1972): urban crisis on the 
Monopoly board 
The King of Marvin Gardens was produced by BBS and financed by Columbia as part of a 
six-picture deal.35 Alongside films such as Five Easy Pieces (Bob Rafelson, 1970), The Last 
Picture Show (Peter Bogdanovich, 1971), and A Safe Place (Henry Jaglom, 1971), Marvin 
Gardens exemplified a new trend towards small scale, auteur filmmaking and flexible 
production strategies within Hollywood. Budgeted at less than $1 million a piece, these 
productions were able to take advantage of IATSE concessions that allowed location 
filming with smaller crews.36 As Andrew Schaefer argues, the filmmakers and writers 
clustered around BBS were the most closely associated with the counterculture and the 
New Left of all the New Hollywood generation.37 Bob Rafelson has since described how 
part of the political outlook and realist ethos of BBS was to explore the hidden corners 
of the American urban landscape, focusing on what he refers to as ‘backwater cities’ such 
as Taft, Bakersfield, and Birmingham (AL).38 Marvin Gardens was shot entirely on 
location, predominantly in Atlantic City, New Jersey, where the screenwriter Jacob 
Brackman had grown up, with some material filmed in nearby Philadelphia. Though 
neither city had opened an official film bureau at this stage, permission to film in Atlantic 
City, including interior scenes at the jail and the Convention Hall, was directly granted by 
Mayor William T. Somers, who had reviewed the script and deemed (perhaps somewhat 
optimistically) that the film would generate “good publicity” for the city.39 As the 
inspiration for the original Monopoly board layout and home of the Miss America 
pageant, Atlantic City has a symbolic presence and especially representational quality that 
Brackman and Rafelson explored, allowing the film to work both as a document of a 
specific city in decline as well as a self-reflexive, allegorical piece about the fortunes of 
America (and Hollywood) at the turn of the 1970s.  
Atlantic City was established by real estate speculators in the 1880s and first rose to 
prominence as a holiday resort in the 1900s. It remained a successful, even affluent 
seaside town throughout the 1920s and 1930s; its Prohibition-era heyday has, of course, 
recently been carefully recreated on screen in Boardwalk Empire (HBO, 2010–). But its 
glamour had already begun to fade in the 1950s, with the rise of international tourism, jet 
travel, and new domestic destinations such as Disneyland. By the sixties, it had become 
an exemplar for urban decay. From this perspective, the rise and fall of Atlantic City, a 
booming resort town from the early 1900s until the late 1940s, roughly paralleled the 
fortunes of the Hollywood studio system itself. As products of American industrial and 
economic expansion, both capitalized on the emergence of a new urban consumer to 
produce new kinds of entertainment and leisure. Similarly, the relative decline of both 
Atlantic City and the Hollywood studios from the 1950s onwards was to a large extent 
caused by similar factors: suburbanization, ‘white flight’, and the rise of new forms of 
leisure and consumption, whether television, out-of-town malls or theme parks. Indeed, 
as Bryant Simon has documented, Atlantic City itself had no less than 15 movie theatres 
in the mid-1950s, the majority of which had closed their doors only a decade later, a 
microcosm of the wider decline in inner city exhibition that was so influential in the 
demise of the studio system.40  
The King of Marvin Gardens captures Atlantic City in the grip of an economic downturn 
that had left it permanently out-of-season. In a New Yorker article of 1972, John McPhee 
captured the extent of its decay, making striking connections between the American 
urban crisis and the ruins of post-war Europe: 
The physical profile of streets perpendicular to the shore is something like a 
playground slide. It begins in the high skyline of Boardwalk hotels, plummets 
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into warrens of “side-avenue” motels, crosses Pacific, slopes through church 
missions, convalescent homes, burlesque houses, rooming houses, and liquor 
stores, crosses Atlantic, and runs level through the bombed-out ghettos as far –
 Baltic, Mediterranean – as the eye can see… Then beyond Atlantic Avenue, 
North Carolina moves on into the vast ghetto, the bulk of the city, and it looks 
like Metz in 1919, Cologne in 1944. Nothing has actually exploded. It is not 
bomb damage. It is deep and complex decay. Roofs are off. Bricks are scattered 
in the street. People sit on porches, six deep, at nine on a Monday morning.41 
However, the film commences not in Atlantic City but in Philadelphia, where 
bespectacled, bookish radio DJ David Staebler (Jack Nicholson) is delivering one of his 
trademark semi-fictionalized autobiographical monologues. Leaving the radio station at 
3am, he walks back through anonymous streets, taking the deserted subway back to his 
grandfather’s house. The next morning, David receives a call from his brother 
summoning him to Atlantic City. Jason Staebler (Bruce Dern) is a small-time hustler with 
outsized entrepreneurial ambitions; on his arrival, David finds Jason temporarily jailed on 
a trumped-up automobile offence. Jason lives with two women in a suite at the 
Marlborough Blenheim hotel: Sally, “a middle-aged Kewpie doll” (Ellen Burstyn) and her 
stepdaughter, Jessica (Julia Ann Robinson). David soon becomes drawn into Jason’s 
latest scheme: a flawed real-estate venture to develop a casino resort on a tiny Pacific 
island, Tiki. Meanwhile, the two women are obsessed with the Miss America pageant, 
and rehearse their routines in empty club venues on the Boardwalk. The fruitless 
entrepreneurial schemes of Jason and David unravel against a drama of family 
psychology that operates on two intersecting levels, the resentment and reconciliation 
between the Staebler brothers on the one hand, and the growing rivalry and antipathy 
between mother and daughter on the other. 
The film ends with a climactic, yet pointless, act of violence, which resolves nothing; 
ultimately, it reads as a satire on the American dream, entrepreneurship, and individual 
success. As such, the film is emblematic of a particular strand of early 1970s American 
cinema in which a mood of inertia, disillusionment, and regret predominates. In his 
landmark 1975 piece on the New Hollywood, Thomas Elsaesser memorably described 
this tendency as “the pathos of failure”. These were films that rejected the affirmative, 
goal-oriented narrative causality of the classical cinema, its action-hero protagonists and 
their implicit ideological functions.42 Instead, this broadly left-oriented cinema 
crystallized this moment of cultural and political aporia through the figure of the 
“unmotivated hero,” whose trajectory was followed either through unresolved, 
meandering journeys — in road movies such as Two Lane Blacktop (Monte Hellman, 
1971) — or else, as in Marvin Gardens, through recourse to “dramatic situations that have 
a kind of negative, self-demolishing dynamic.”43 While the Staebler brothers are not, 
strictly speaking, “unmotivated” — Jason in particular is propelled by the manic 
entrepreneurial zeal of the con-artist — the film is nevertheless marked by various 
failures, from the brothers’ doomed real-estate venture to the more personal and 
psychological blockages that lead to the film’s tragic conclusion.  
The ‘Marvin Gardens’ of the title is, of course, a direct allusion to the Monopoly board, 
which took the names of Atlantic City’s streets when it was first mass-manufactured by 
Parker Brothers during the 1930s.44 This provides a symbolic map – one closely 
associated with a specific period of American capitalism – which Rafelson juxtaposes 
with the real geography of the city in order to explore his themes of crisis and failure. As 
the director confirmed, “Monopoly and Atlantic City are very clear metaphors for the 
American Dream.”45 Each block of the original Monopoly board corresponded to a 
genuine location in Atlantic City, with the exception of Marvin Gardens. This property is 
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a misspelling of a real suburb just outside the city, Marven Gardens, its name a 
composite of two neighbouring areas, Margate and Ventnor. The film’s use of the 
Monopoly spelling therefore opens up a split or opposition between Marven/Marvin – 
the symbiotic relationship between a “real” place and its representation – while at the 
same time, setting up the Monopoly board as an organizing metaphor for the film as a 
whole. The title therefore makes an allusion to a particular phase of American capitalism 
— “monopoly capitalism” — then entering into a period of crisis.46 The film’s Monopoly 
board metaphor therefore offers a useful way to frame some of the relationships 
between the crisis of classical Hollywood narrative and the spatial reorganization of 
American cities in the 1970s.  
The Monopoly board is not only an implicit narrative form – Horatio Alger reformatted 
as financial bildungsroman – but also a diagram of the American city. Significantly, it 
schematizes the urban basis of capital accumulation: making a fortune is directly related 
to the player’s ability to invest in real estate, build housing and speculate on hotel 
construction. The central irony of Marvin Gardens is, of course, that the blighted urban 
landscape of Atlantic City seems to offer no possibility of success for those ‘playing’ the 
game. Indeed, by the 1970s, the Monopoly diagram of the city was looking increasingly 
anachronistic, as global market forces reconfigured the relative relationship between 
cities and regions at national and international scales. In short, the symbolic space of the 
Monopoly board had become fundamentally estranged by the influence of places and 
processes not visible on the board — that is to say, beyond the city or the macro-
economy of the nation state. 
As Franco Moretti has argued, narrative forms have often been strongly influenced by 
their geographical context. For example, Moretti maps connections between narrative 
conventions in the 19th century realist novel (Dickens, Balzac) and the geography, 
complexity and class structure of the rapidly expanding cities of London and Paris.47 
Similarly, Fredric Jameson has argued that the modernist breakdown of realist narrative 
in the early 20th century crystallized a schism between the lived experience of the 
individual and the increasingly complex and abstract structures that defined and 
organized that experience.48 Postmodernism stages this same problematic at a higher 
order, for the global financial and technological networks of advanced capitalism have 
developed a hitherto unimaginable level of complexity, scale and abstraction such that 
traditional narrative forms have been faced with incommensurable representational 
crises.49 As he succinctly put it in an interview: 
Narrative seems supremely able to deal with the way in which the truth of 
individual life was constructed by smaller environments. In the nineteenth-
century novel, the narrative apparatus became much more complex in order to 
deal with the truth of individual experience in a national setting, and of course 
even more so in imperial settings. But in the global perspective of late capitalism, 
there’s a real crisis in this older narrative machinery.50 
This crisis of the “narrative machinery” of classical Hollywood is, of course, one of the 
key characteristics of 1970s cinema, in which we often find narratives that are episodic, 
dedramatized, and essentially unresolved.51 In these terms, Elsaesser’s “pathos of failure” 
can be closely linked to a crisis of cognitive mapping, of space and political subjectivity. 
as films such as The King of Marvin Gardens demonstrate, this problematic relationship 
between the individual and their cognitive mapping of social space is not only evident in 
overtly postmodernist “hyperspaces” such as Portman’s Bonaventure Hotel, but is also 
applicable to the decaying cities of the rustbelt.52 
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Figure 1: The Staebler brothers attempt to map their offshore casino development. The King of Marvin 
Gardens (Columbia Pictures, 1972). 
This inability to effectively map the global and the local is articulated in the film through 
the disparity between the protagonists’ point of view and the spatial or cartographic 
imagery offered to the spectator. While the film’s locations document the effects of 
disinvestment in the urban environment, the narrative provides little means of historical 
contextualization. The Staebler brothers’ plan to open a holiday resort on a deserted 
island off Hawaii gestures at the new global realities of the 1970s, as do the now-dated 
scenes with the Japanese businessmen. Their attempts at offshore expansion inevitably 
fall flat, and the narrative remains largely contained within the boundaries of the seaside 
town. Two specific moments in the film underscore the Staeblers’ attempts at ‘cognitive 
mapping’. In an extended scene in the hotel suite, they spread out maps of the Pacific on 
the floor, projecting their dreams for success beyond the city and into global space 
(figure 1). Later, they survey their surroundings from the panoramic viewpoint of a 
fairground ride, which offers a broader view of the cityscape uncharacteristic of the 
film’s largely contained mise-en-scene. Jason’s dialogue here also acknowledges the 
lamentable decline of Atlantic City itself, which he promises will not be allowed to 
happen on Tiki: “This could have been a fantastic island right here. It was full-out class 
until about 1930 – until you could hop a plane out to Bermuda for the weekend… Let 
that be a lesson to us. I promise you – strict controls on Tiki. We can’t ever let it go 
downhill. That’s why I won’t let anyone build on anything less than 10 acres. No 
Pokerino, no frozen custard, no Salt Water Taffy.” Beyond Atlantic City, the film is 
bookended with scenes of Nicholson in Philadelphia, which outside the family home is 
chiefly figured through two carefully framed shots of the neon-lit curtain wall of the 
“Industrial Valley Bank”. These brief, silent images hint at another architectural and 
social world — of global finance, downtown redevelopment, International Style 
modernism  — visual signifiers of the wider economic and urban processes in which 
Atlantic City is implicated.  
While linear narrative became arguably less central to Hollywood narrative in the early 
seventies, this was arguably counterbalanced by the heightened importance of location 
and place. In Marvin Gardens, Rafelson and cinematographer Laszlo Kovacs used a series 
of specific aesthetic strategies to depict the urban environment. Shots linger on the 
empty space of the windswept Boardwalk, a starkly depopulated locale in which the 
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teeming crowd of the modern city has disappeared (figure 2). Kovacs’s deep focus 
cinematography makes subtle use of the affective properties of winter light to give the 
deserted cityscape a melancholy quality that Rafelson likened to the work of painter 
Maurice Utrillo. Throughout, the material presence of the built environment takes 
precedence over the classical Hollywood emphasis on narrative. This sense of 
dedramatized narrative is accentuated by Rafelson’s decision to keep the camera entirely 
still in all the exterior shots, a technique he borrowed from the films of Yasujiro Ozu.53 
This languid temporality and sense of stillness or stasis is further emphasised by insistent 
long takes and the complete absence of non-diegetic music. Such non-classical stylistic 
patterns were picked up by contemporary critics, who found strong echoes of European 
cinematic modernism in Marvin Gardens. For example, Foster Hirsch in the New York 
Times drew a comparison between the desolate backdrop of Atlantic City and the empty 
landscapes of Antonioni’s L’Avventura. Hirsch also noted other formal motifs with 
European resonances: “there are Antonioni shadows, as well, in the languorous and 
rhythmic pacing, and in the device of allowing the camera to remain, fleetingly, on the 
scene after the action proper has been completed.”54  
 
Figure 2: The Atlantic City Boardwalk in The King of Marvin Gardens (Columbia Pictures, 1972) 
Rafelson has recently described how the properties of Atlantic City inspired this stylistic 
approach, recalling how he had fallen in love with “the geometry of the place”. The 
Monopoly board metaphor also influenced his construction of cinematic space, leading 
him to place the camera at an unusually diagonal or perpendicular angle to the actors as if 
they were pieces in the board game itself:55 “The way the board is organized fascinates 
me: it's very linear, very geometric. The pieces can only move in straight lines and right 
angles… I thought this peculiar way of moving the pieces could be used as a style of 
movement for the film images.”56 This style is perhaps most clearly articulated in a 
sustained two-shot where the Staebler brothers talk to each other while mounted on 
horseback at 90 degrees to the camera (figure 3). This slightly mannered and self-
conscious construction of space also operates through what Rafelson referred to as 
“creative geography” in exterior scenes: a set of framing and editing strategies for 
emphasizing and amplifying certain elements of the pro-filmic space in relation to the 
characters, so that shots would alternately frame the protagonists against the boundless, 
open natural space of the beach and the ocean, and the decaying hotel façades.57 
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Figure 3: Geometrical framing replicates board game pieces. The King of Marvin Gardens (Columbia 
Pictures, 1972) 
One further element of the Monopoly board metaphor needs to be illuminated. When 
considering how geographical locations operate within the spatial system of a film, we 
must always also ask: what spaces are not represented, remaining invisible and implicitly 
marginalized, and what logic of exclusion might govern such choices or render them 
possible? Such missing spaces can be seen to operate as structuring absences, implicitly 
framing, stabilizing, or de-stabilizing the meaning of the visible screen space. In the case 
of Rafelson’s film, the Marvin (Marven) Gardens of the title is such a missing location, 
neither referred to nor physically present in the film. As Jay Boyer puts it in his study of 
Bob Rafelson, “much of the board game Monopoly has a basis in the actual geography 
and street system of Atlantic City; not so Marvin Gardens. This most valuable piece of 
property is purely fictitious, and for Jason to be its monarch is to be an emperor of air.”58 
Though technically, this is true — Marvin Gardens, following the Monopoly board 
spelling, is indeed a fabrication — the real location and meaning of Marven Gardens has 
a further resonance which is worth some consideration.  
In his New Yorker piece, ‘The Search for Marven Gardens’, John McPhee develops a 
running joke: nobody in Atlantic City appears to have heard of this elusive area, or 
knows of its whereabouts. Finally, he discovers its location: a couple of miles south of 
the city, it lies between the suburbs of Margate and Ventnor. The area “consists of solid 
buildings of stucco, brick, and wood, with slate roofs, tile roofs, multi-mullioned 
porches, Giraldic towers, and Spanish grilles.” Marvin Gardens, we are told, is “the 
ultimate outwash of Monopoly… a citadel and sanctuary of the middle class.” 
Interviewing a local resident, he elicits a clear expression of suburban fear: “We’re heavily 
patrolled by police here. We don’t take no chances.”59 An exclusive suburban 
development, Marven Gardens is emblematic of one of the crucial factors behind the 
urban crisis: that the mass disinvestment from inner city areas was predicated upon the 
migration of the white middle-classes away from the increasingly plural, democratic 
public spaces of the city towards secluded and implicitly segregated private spaces that 
could be safely monitored and controlled. As Bryant Simon explains, the historical 
development and decline of Atlantic City can be elucidated through an understanding of 
the role of the white middle-class and its attitudes to race and public space: 
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Beginning in the 1960s, Atlantic City stopped being a place where people lived 
their lives on the streets and on their porches. Many families retreated inside 
behind lace curtains, barred windows, and double-locked doors, and then out to 
the suburbs. Foregoing sidewalks, parks, corner stores, and movie houses, they 
looked inwards, and in so doing, they exchanged the close quarters and intense 
daily interactions of the neighborhood for the more controlled, easily protected, 
yet less stimulating life of private homes in segregated, middle-class sanctuaries 
like Marven Gardens.60 
As Simon demonstrates, the type of public space represented by Atlantic City was “never 
about democracy; it was about exclusion… During its heyday, Atlantic City was a Jim 
Crow town.”61 The decline of Atlantic City as a holiday destination was determined to a 
large extent by two external factors: firstly, the advent of cheap intercontinental jet travel 
had made foreign holidays accessible to many for the first time, against which traditional 
resorts such as Atlantic City seemed pedestrian and outdated; secondly, the development 
of two new holiday resorts: Disneyland (opened in Anaheim, California in 1955) and Las 
Vegas, both of which represented new forms of proto-postmodern consumer space, 
selling differing sorts of fantasies to holidaymakers. As Bryant Simon observes, 
Disneyland capitalized on a desire for “long-lost, safe public places,” precisely that type 
of public experience which had once been provided by the Boardwalk itself: “Behind its 
thick fortress walls, Disney created a public sphere, much like the Boardwalk, the 
shopping mall, and the casino, based on the economically viable principles of exclusion 
mixed with the illusion of equal access and democracy.”62  
Tellingly, the issue of race was little discussed in the US reception of the film, though the 
French critic Michel Grisolia went so far as to suggest to Rafelson that Marvin Gardens 
might be seen as “a political film about the rise of black power.”63 While the director 
remained equivocal on this point, he nevertheless recognized elements of truth to the 
critic’s overstatement. Though it is relatively submerged, Marvin Gardens does suggest that 
a certain kind of white middle-class space has been displaced or decentred. The real 
centre of power in the Staebler’s world is, in fact, the sharply attired mob boss Lewis 
(Scatman Crothers), who appears to have the power to keep Jason in or out of prison. 
Beginning with David’s initial meeting with Lewis, during which a heated argument is 
taking place in the adjacent room, we are left with the sensation that a more exciting and 
conventional crime film is unfolding off-screen. This notion is redoubled by the sudden 
appearance of two of Lewis’s associates in the hotel, who appear to have stepped straight 
out of a blaxploitation movie (a genre then in its first flush of success), and in the 
representation of Lewis’s nightclub, the only public space represented as having any 
vitality in the entire city (figure 4).64    
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Figure 4: David is threatened by one of Lewis’s associates in The King of Marvin Gardens (Columbia 
Pictures, 1972) 
While the Staebler brothers’ casino development and real estate speculation remained a 
pipe-dream in the film, it was shortly to take on a new topicality. Following a referendum 
in November 1976, the state of New Jersey passed an amendment to legalize gambling 
within the boundaries of Atlantic City. This rapid change was captured on film by Louis 
Malle, in his 1979 film Atlantic City. The opening and closing credits of Malle’s film show 
documentary footage of the empty hotels that dominated the mise-en-scène of The King of 
Marvin Gardens being dynamited to make way for new casino-hotel developments. 
Intended as a ‘magic bullet’, the legislation aimed to revitalize the flagging resort town by 
stimulating economic growth, creating employment, and driving urban redevelopment. 
Described by the architectural historian Thomas Hines as “radical therapy for a dying 
city”, the gambling experiment in Atlantic City stands not only as a prototypical 
neoliberal restructuring strategy but also as a microcosm of the wider transition of the 
American economy towards “casino capitalism”.65  
Rocky (John G Avildsen, 1976): Steadicam aesthetics and downtown 
renaissance 
While The King of Marvin Gardens and Atlantic City both contained brief scenes filmed in 
Philadelphia, these presented the city relatively anonymously, a generic big city in 
contrast to the seaside town of Atlantic City. Indeed, despite the historical and cultural 
importance of Philadelphia to the United States, the city’s rich architectural heritage was 
relatively rarely seen on screen throughout the classical period, a situation perhaps best 
exemplified by the fact that The Philadelphia Story (George Cukor, 1940) was not shot in 
the city but entirely at the MGM studios in Culver City. However, from the late 1970s 
onwards, increasing amounts of location shoots were drawn to the city. This built on the 
runaway success of Rocky, which played a vital role in bringing Hollywood productions to 
the city; despite being shot without municipal permits, Rocky is now fêted by the Greater 
Philadelphia Film Office as the inaugural picture in a sequence of films that would use 
Philadelphia as a backlot during the 1980s and beyond.66 The character’s transformation 
and triumph was, of course, also parallelled by the film’s own extraordinary box-office 
success — returning $117 million in domestic rentals against production costs under $1 
million — and the rise of Sylvester Stallone as a self-made Hollywood entrepreneur.67 
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Though Rocky is arguably one of the key films in which American cinema regained its 
confidence in linear, goal-oriented narrative, it remains fundamentally split between the 
urban realist tendencies that characterized certain strands of early 1970s cinema and an 
individualist, rise-to-success plot that would become commonplace in 1980s Hollywood. 
In this regard, Rocky reworks the boxing genre’s social realist traditions: while its use of 
the authentic urban locations of Philadelphia’s working class districts suggests a critical 
and potentially progressive stance on the urban crisis, this is countered by a narrative 
paradigm which allows collective renewal only on individualist terms through self-help 
and free enterprise. Further, Rocky was one of several films of the mid-1970s that 
developed new relationships to screen space through their then-innovative use of the 
Steadicam, and it is precisely this new spatial mobility in Rocky that provides not only a 
compelling figure for social mobility but also an enduring symbol for the fiscal 
“disciplining” and revitalization of the city itself at the end of the decade. 
Like other rust belt cities, Philadelphia had entered into a state of precipitous decline by 
the late 1960s. Rapid suburbanization led to extensive population loss from the central 
city, with processes of deindustrialization, suburbanization and containerization 
producing devastating effects on the city’s economic well-being. Though New York’s 
famous fiscal crisis and near-default of 1975 is more widely remembered, former 
industrial hubs such as Philadelphia, Detroit and Cleveland were also in dire financial 
straits by the mid-1970s. A substantial decline in industrial output, the erosion of the 
city’s tax base through population outflow, and the increased spending commitments 
concomitant with high unemployment were compounded both by the worldwide 
economic downturn of 1973-4 and the retrenchment in urban welfare programs enacted 
by the Nixon administration.68 In the year that Rocky was released the city recorded 
municipal debts of $86 million and the city’s credit status was subsequently downgraded 
by rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Cuts ensued in public services, jobs, 
and public sector wages, alongside a punitive 30% rise in local tax rates, leading the New 
York Times to reflect on the disparity between the state of the city and its new-found 
cinematic icon: “In the movie, Rocky lost the championship fight, but it didn’t matter. In 
Philadelphia, there are plenty of real life losers. Some of the problems here are a school 
fund crisis, dilapidated housing, a federal investigation of the police department for 
alleged brutality and friction between the one third of the population that is black and 
the two thirds that is white.”69 
Yet 1976 was also the year that America celebrated the bicentennial anniversary of its 
foundation, an occasion which offered its oldest city an opportunity to reposition itself 
on the global stage as a revitalized centre of tourism, entertainment and commerce. As 
Andrew Feffer explains, “the staging of the Bicentennial underscored the spectacular 
nature of redevelopment, in which the visual makeover of private and public spaces 
served efforts to improve the city’s ‘symbolic economy’ — to reshape the urban 
landscape as a marketable commodity and to advertise the downtown as an attractive 
destination for tourism, consumerism, and resettlement.”70 Indeed, city officials of all 
stripes were quick to seize on Rocky as a local icon and symbol for the city’s renewed 
vitality and projected renaissance.71 In this sense, Rocky engages with the city at a 
distinctive watershed moment, when a neoliberal paradigm of redevelopment was 
emerging from the ashes of the urban crisis. As I will explore further through an analysis 
of two key moments in the film, Rocky allegorizes the city’s crisis and revitalization 
through its central narrative of individual discipline and achievement and its construction 
of cinematic space. 
The first half of the film develops a strong sense of containment within the Italian 
neighborhood through a series of distinctive locations: the boxing gym and the pet shop, 
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the docks and peripheral industrial spaces, the characteristic Philadelphia row-houses and 
street corners. The financial opportunities of such an environment are limited and on the 
edge of legality: as a small-time boxer, Rocky’s physical labor is unrewarding (he wins just 
$40 for a fight in the opening sequence); as a debt collector for the mafia, he hassles 
hard-up dock workers, themselves struggling against inflation and wage-freezes. The 
exterior street scenes in Rocky’s neighborhood were filmed in Kensington, one of the 
city’s declining inner-ring areas, which contemporary accounts described as a desolate 
landscape of empty factories, derelict stores and rubble-strewn lots.72 The earlier sections 
of the film focus closely on the decay of the Italian neighborhood and the industrial zone 
surrounding the docks — still operating but, it is suggested, affected by containerization 
— which unlike the busy New Jersey docks portrayed in On the Waterfront (Elia Kazan, 
1954), are almost empty of workers. Camera viewpoints are on the whole pedestrian and 
largely static; the only cars belong to Rocky’s mafia employers. Wide shots predominate, 
situating Rocky as an isolated figure in the industrial landscape. In one particularly 
notable sequence, Stallone walks into the distance along a railway siding, the camera 
remaining fixed. The railings and sidewalk bisect the frame diagonally, converging 
towards the vanishing point in a geometrical composition, a muted, wintry palette of 
greys, browns and blacks (figure 5). Elsewhere, the camera lingers on wasteland and the 
decaying infrastructure of the industrial city, paying close attention to the material decline 
of the built environment. 
 
Figure 5: Images of stasis and decay in the first half of Rocky (United Artists, 1976). 
While the first half of the film is characterized by a sense of stasis and immobility, 
drawing on the ‘pathos of failure’ of early 1970s Hollywood and its evocation of 
postindustrial masculinity in crisis, it is in the later sections, as Rocky Balboa begins his 
training, that the film’s relationship to space is transformed by the introduction of the 
Steadicam, through which the film finds a new mobility around the city. The famous rise-
to-success montage is, crucially, constructed as a journey through Philadelphia, linking 
Rocky’s physical and psychological transformation directly to the urban environment 
and, as I will argue, producing an allegory or spatial metaphor for urban renaissance.  
As the Steadicam is central to producing the speed, fluidity and mobility of Rocky’s 
training sequences, it is worth briefly considering the development of the technology 
itself and its relationship to this specific historical conjuncture. Though the first feature 
to use the Steadicam was Hal Ashby’s decidedly non-urban Woodie Guthrie biopic Bound 
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For Glory (1976), it came to prominence in two films from the same year, Rocky and 
Marathon Man (John Schlesinger, 1976), both of which memorably focused on the motif 
of running and movement through urban space. Developed by the cameraman and 
inventor Garrett Brown in the early 1970s and first marketed by Cinema Products 
Corporation in 1975, the Steadicam was one of a number of technological innovations 
that helped to develop new practices in location shooting during the decade. A camera 
stabilizing device that attaches to the operator’s body, enabling fluid, mobile shots 
without the unevenness and bumpiness of handheld camerawork, the Steadicam opened 
up new possibilities for location filming and the presentation of screen space, allowing 
for lengthy sequence shots without laying dolly track and novel camera movements such 
as 360-degree pans.73   
As John Belton has argued with respect to the introduction of CinemaScope and colour 
processes, technological innovation in Hollywood is not necessarily the primary driver of 
change; rather, new technologies have tended to be adopted only when they also fulfill 
economic and ideological functions for the industry.74 The economic and logistical 
benefits of the Steadicam were clearly articulated across a series of promotional features 
in the trade press at the time, which emphasized its ability to reduce costs, cut down on 
crew, and to enable shooting in difficult locations, especially city streets. Writing in 
American Cinematographer, experienced Steadicam operator Ted Churchill described the 
usefulness of Steadicam for working in urban locations, allowing film crews to operate 
relatively unobtrusively among city crowds and respond to the contingencies of such 
situations. As he put it, “it’s indispensable when it becomes impossible to ‘own’ the 
territory in which one is shooting”.75 Avildsen exploited this territorial flexibility on the 
production of Rocky, which minimized costs by shooting rapidly in Philadelphia with a 
non-union crew and without city permits.76 The director explained how he would use the 
neighborhood as a kind of filmmaking resource: “We went in low profile and did it like 
the old days, operating in the poor section of town and getting people into the spirit of 
things.”77 Avildsen’s reference here to the “old days” refers to his early days making low-
budget exploitation films for Lloyd Kaufman’s Troma, an experience that informed the 
style and production values of Rocky.78 Kaufman assisted on the shoot, and later recalled 
himself and Avildsen “zipping around the city in eight days making sure his non-union 
crew wasn't spotted by union representatives. At a Los Angeles screening of Rocky, 
Kaufman said, ‘union guys were trying to remember when they shot that footage.’”79 
Philadelphia was also central to the development of the training sequence, which drew 
direct inspiration from Garrett Brown’s original test film for the Steadicam prototype, in 
which he filmed his partner running up and down the steps of the Art Museum.80  
While Steadicam therefore fitted the new mobile and flexible production regime of New 
Hollywood, its aesthetic properties also fulfilled what we might describe as ideological 
functions for the industry. At a time when Hollywood’s continuity codes and 
conventions of screen space had been seriously challenged and destabilized, Steadicam 
provided a way of absorbing and smoothing out some of the more disruptive elements 
of the first wave of New Hollywood. On the one hand, it enabled freedom of 
movement, spatial dynamism and the kind of restless, excessive visuality now associated 
with post-classical style. Yet at the same time, it ensured stability, smoothness, continuity, 
and, as was argued at the time, an enhanced realism. As Churchill explained, “Steadicam 
was designed to solve a persistent problem which had plagued cinematographers for 
quite a few years: how to make the camera as mobile and versatile as a human being 
while rendering a stable and accurate frame competitive with traditional, but more 
complicated, techniques.”81 While freeing up radical new possibilities, the Steadicam and 
its aesthetics were also consonant with essentially classical values, such as the stability of 
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the frame and the accentuation of a human subjectivity allied to the camera’s viewpoint 
or embodiment of space. Ed DiGiulio, president of Cinema Products Corporation, also 
argued that it increased realism by eliminating the shaky footage associated with 
handheld shooting; as he put it, “the human eye does not rock-and-roll and bump the 
way the hand-held camera of Cinéma Verité was wont to do”.82 The Steadicam therefore 
operated both literally and figuratively as a ‘shock absorber’, allowing post-classical 
cinema to incorporate a new fluidity and complexity of movement within the shot while 
eliminating the more disruptive, imperfect and essentially modernist properties associated 
with films of the late 1960s and early 1970s.83 
In Rocky, Steadicam is central in producing the formal and affective properties of the 
training sequences and in their engagement with the city. Rocky’s physical 
transformation, the self-discipline of the body — symbolically, the self-discipline of the 
body politic of the city — is mapped out as a journey across urban space. Starting in the 
industrial wasteland surrounding the docks (figure 6), we are reminded of Gilles 
Deleuze’s “any-space-whatever”: spaces that are “deserted but inhabited, disused 
warehouses, waste ground, cities in the course of demolition or reconstruction.”84 
Moving fluidly through the litter-strewn streets of the 9th Street Market, the camera 
follows Rocky in smooth, uninterrupted takes, through the park, along the waterfront, 
and then, famously and triumphantly, up the steps towards the monumental neo-classical 
edifice of the Philadelphia Museum of Art, looking out across the Benjamin Franklin 
Parkway and downtown Philadelphia (figures 7 and 8). Here, we are presented with a set 
of spatial oppositions to the confinement and stasis of the docks and the Italian 
neighborhood: this is open, classical, public space; highly iconic; and elevated above the 
city. The architecture associated with Rocky’s transformation — the Greek-revival 
museum, designed by Horace Trumbauer (1919-1928) — is pointedly not the 
International Style modernism of Philadelphia’s Central Business District, but rather 
leaps further back to draw on the city’s status as the birthplace of American democracy. 
Through identification with this monumental space and its elevated position, the 
viewpoint suggests a newly acquired ability to produce a cognitive map of the spatial and 




Figures 6-8: Rocky’s mobility through urban space as symbol of urban regeneration. Rocky (United 
Artists, 1976). 
Through his paradigmatic movement from the old neighborhood to the monumental 
space of American democracy, Rocky’s “urban voyage” becomes a figure for upward 
social mobility and the revitalization and renewal of the city more generally. Through this 
celebratory, highly influential rise-to-success montage sequence, Hollywood film can be 
seen to have regained its “action image,” which is here aligned with individual enterprise 
and entrepreneurship. Steadicam not only enables this new mobility through urban space, 
but is also central in producing the affective charge and euphoric rush of Rocky’s 
transformation for the spectator. This moment marks an implicit move away from the 
‘pathos of failure’ associated with American cinema in first half of the 1970s — and from 
the crisis both in Hollywood and in the American inner city — and points forward to the 
renewed dominance of the blockbuster and the neoliberal downtown renaissance of the 
1980s and beyond. 
The film’s politics are broadly populist, reflecting Avildsen’s notion of the film as a 
“classic, Frank Capra type story”.85 Indeed, Capra himself is known to have admired the 
picture, and its relationship to Capra’s Depression-era populism is clear at the level of 
ideology as well as narrative form. 86 Yet the values which constituted the ideological 
backbone of Capra’s work — individualism, enterprise, and “self-help” in the economic 
sphere, alongside a distrust of both corporate power and federal government — take on 
different resonances in the context of neoliberal economic policy and urban 
redevelopment in the 1970s. As Leger Grindon argues, the revitalized boxing movies of 
the late 1970s constructed “the boxer as a white-working class hero no longer under 
allegiance to New Deal liberalism but as spokesman for the ‘silent majority’”.87 Rocky’s 
chance at the title is explicitly associated with American individualist ideology. As 
Rocky’s adversary Apollo Creed puts it, “American history proves that everybody’s got a 
chance to win.” This viewpoint resonates with emerging right-wing positions on the 
urban and economic crisis, exemplified by influential studies such as Edward Banfield’s 
The Unheavenly City (1970).88 For Banfield and other neoconservative thinkers such as 
Irving Kristol and George Gilder, urban renewal programs, and social welfare policies 
more generally, were not only misguided but damaging and ideologically suspect. It was 
to become a totemic belief for the right that renewal policies and social welfare had not 
only failed to solve the urban crisis; they had, it was argued, helped to cause the crisis 
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through fostering a sense of dependency and a ghetto mentality which worked against 
their ideal, equality of opportunity — an equality best offered by a deregulated free-
market consumer society.89  
The film’s submerged anti-corporate sentiments are implicitly mobilized against Apollo 
Creed, who is consistently identified with big business: sharp suits, downtown office 
space, and an immaculately managed media profile. In contrast, Rocky is a self-styled 
“ham-and-egger”. As Peter Biskind and Barbara Ehrenreich have argued, Rocky 
symbolized a beleaguered, white-working class masculinity under siege from the advances 
of feminism and civil rights.90 Rocky is also notably based around a white protagonist in a 
period where both boxing and the inner city had become to a large extent African-
American. The film imagines African-Americans gaining political and economic 
ascendancy, whether the up-and-coming black fighter displacing Rocky in the gym, or 
through the figure of Apollo Creed himself. Yet despite the obvious racial significance of 
the confrontation between Balboa and Creed, the film skirts around the issue of racial 
politics, arguably concealing or seeking to downplay the real extent of racial tensions 
within the city. Since WWII, Philadelphia had undergone a substantive demographic shift 
that reordered its racial profile: while ethnic minorities made up 18.3% of the total in 
1950, African-Americans alone constituted 37.8% of the city’s population by 1980.91 The 
race riots that exploded in 1964 were one of the first signals of a widespread escalation of 
the urban crisis during the 1960s, reflecting the fact that urban disinvestment and 
destructive renewal policies had made a disproportionate impact on black neighborhoods 
in central and north Philadelphia. Racial tension in the city was further escalated by the 
election of so-called “supercop” Mayor Frank Rizzo (Chief of Police from 1967-71 and 
Mayor from 1972-1980). Indeed, Rocky’s celebration of “white-ethnic”, working-class 
identity tallies with the rise to power of Rizzo, whose law-and-order rhetoric, reputation 
for brutality and racist policing tactics frayed race relations in the city throughout the 
1970s.  
Conclusion 
Across these two films, I have traced the ways in which substantial realignments in 
Hollywood’s spatial and affective landscape – from the sensations of stasis, failure, and 
immobility evoked by much of the the lower-budget output of the early 1970s, to 
mobility, flexibility and euphoria in the later part of the decade – can be linked to the 
wider economic-industrial shifts both in Hollywood and the American city. As 
Hollywood’s new production practices and developments in urban public policy 
catalyzed a new engagement with urban space, New Hollywood cinema established what 
Thomas Elsaesser has referred to as “a new iconography of place alongside a new 
emotional topography”.92 However, the first phase of New Hollywood was only a brief 
interregnum, and the dominating legacy of the 1970s is, of course, the second phase and 
the revitalized blockbuster format. Yet the mobile and flexible production strategies 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s, alongside the series of tax breaks and incentives that 
lure location shooting, remain central to the political economy of contemporary 
Hollywood. Indeed, since a new global economic crisis emerged in 2008, following a 
collapse in property markets and ‘subprime’ lending in the United States, the streets of 
the post-industrial, rust belt city have become, perhaps paradoxically, ever more visible 
on screen and increasingly popular as a location shooting destination. The municipal 
advocacy for location shooting that developed in the 1970s, though recently tested by 
fiscal restraints, is still strong, with aggressive tax breaks providing persuasive financial 
incentives for Hollywood, while the paradigm of the cultural or ‘creative’ city remains an 
enduring ideology for city governments. In particular, there has been a sharp increase in 
location shooting in recent years in so-called ‘second tier’ cities such as Philadelphia, in 
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Baby Mama (Michael McCullers, 2008), How do you Know (James L Brooks, 2010), and 
Silver Linings Playbook (David O Russell, 2012); Pittsburgh in Adventureland (Greg Mottola, 
2009), The Perks of Being a Wallflower (Stephen Chbosky, 2012) and The Next Three Days 
(Paul Haggis, 2010); Detroit in Gran Torino (Clint Eastwood, 2008); or Boston in The 
Company Men (John Wells, 2010) and The Town (Ben Affleck, 2010). The streets of the 
post-industrial city therefore remain a vital artistic inspiration and production resource 
for the motion picture industry: whether gentrified and redeveloped (Brooklyn) or 
seemingly stuck in seventies-era crisis (Detroit), rust belt cities have since become firmly 
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